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APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF
The Appellee's brief and argument throughout this proceeding has focused
on the acts and proposed acts of one William Pringle. Appellee has successfully
argued that what did not occur, would have; has been able to substitute conjecture
for actuality; supposition for fact; and has shifted the focus of the case from the
consequences of the Appellee's undeniable failure to act in accordance with its
fiduciary obligations. The undisputed facts are that the Appellees appeared as
fiduciaries for the Appellants at a tax sale where they were instructed to bid
$35,000.00 on property; that the Appellees bid only $11,000.00; that the property
sold for $11,250.00. The fact is that the Appellant lost any chance to be the
successful bidder because of the Appellee's breach of it's contract with Appellant,
not because of anything Mr. Pringle did.
Appellee convinced the trial court that William Pringle's statements of
contingent future behavior were facts, but are they? Clearly Mr. Pringle's bids are
facts - they occurred. The balance of what Mr. Pringle said could never have been
subjected to the rigorous scrutiny and proof requirements that would elevate the
statements to facts. First, what Appellees produced as affidavits from Mr. Pringle
refer to what Mr. Pringle avers he would have done had the bidding proceeded, not
to what actually happened. Second the statements were belied by actual facts.
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Appellants present two basic arguments in their appeal: first, that the failure
to bid, causing the termination of the auction, caused the Appellants' loss ; and
second, even if the potential bid of Mr. Pringle is to be determinative on the
question causation, there are material facts in issue relating to his bidding which
render the matter unsuitable for summary determination
The core of Appellants' first argument is that due to the nature of the effect
of the breach (the end of the bidding and award of the property to the successful
bidder) the Appellees' breach itself was the immediate and effective cause of the
Appellants' loss and that in proving the breach the burden of persuasion as to proof
of causation was met as well. In Appellant's view, the question of what Mr. Pringle
might have bid is relevant only to the defense of the claim, a burden that the
defendant would bear. Otherwise, in an auction with anonymous bidders, a
fiduciary agent defendant who failed to bid as instructed would not be subject to
liability to its principal, which would render any such contract illusory.
Contrary to the repeated assertions of the Appellees, Appellants did Provide
admissible evidence to prove that Appellants would have been the successful
bidders at the auction, but for Appellees' tortious breach of contract. Thus even
were the Court to reject Appellants first contention and find it relevant to divine
what Mr. Pringle would have bid, summary judgment would be inappropriate.
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Contrary to the Appellees' statement heading "Issue No. II" of their brief
(Appellee's Brief, p. 23) Appellants produced the following admissible evidence
which established that Appellees would have outbid Mr. Pringle had they bid as
instructed: a non-hearsay statement of Mr. Pringle, together with Mr. Pringle's
prior bid records. Mr. Pringle admitted to bringing only $30,000.00 to the cash
auction and admitted that he was bidding other property as well. This statement is
admissible and is not hearsay as it is not used for proving the truth of the matter
asserted (ie that he had only $30,000.00 and was bidding on other property), rather
for proof that he would not have outbid the $35,000.00 the Appellees were
instructed to bid. State v. Haltom, 121 P.3d 42, 2005 UT 348 (Utah App., 2005),
cert granted, 125 P.3d 102 (2005); State v. Olsen, 860 P2d 332 (Utah, 1993).
Accordingly, Appellees' claim (Appellees' Brief, Issue III) that Mr. Pringle's
unavailability as a witness prevents the Appellants from proving their case just is
not so, unless these statements are found to be inadmissible. Additionally, the
Appellant submitted Kane County's own records of Mr. Pringle's prior bids which
showed him to be a 'bargain basement' shopper [to the same effect see Bryan
Pringle's testimony, R285, lines 8-17] who had never, in 17 prior bids, bid more
than $5250.00 [R132] or more than the market value of any property (the market
value of this property was $8349.00[R26, 28], so it can be argued that Mr. Pringle
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was already stretching). Given that summary dispositon under Rule 56(c) is
appropriate only when it clearly appears that there are no issues of material fact
which, if resolved in favor of the non-mo vant would entitle him to prevail, Russell
v. Park City Corp., 29 Utah 2d 184, 506 P. 2d 1274(1973); University Club v.
Invesco Holding Corp., 29 Utah 2d 1, 504 P. 2d 29 (1972); Wingets, Inc v. Bitters,
28 Utah 2d 231, 500 P. 2d 1007 (1972), it is submitted that the lower court erred in
granting appellants summary judgment motion below.
Interestingly, Appellees seek to have the matter of Mr. Pringle's statements
and characterization as a witness both ways in their brief arguing on the one hand
that his statements prove what he would have bid, yet arguing on the other that he
is not a witness. (Appellee's Brief: pages 10,11,12; Addendum A34). Appellees
even adopt a portion of the taped recording of the Appellant's conversation with
Mr. Pringle in their brief (Appellee's Brief, p. 24). Further, the Appellees
attempted to bolster the unverifiable statements of Mr. Pringle with testimony of
his son Bryan Pringle. Bryan Pringle was not at the auction (R280, lines 10-16);
did not make the decisions as to how much to bid (R279, line 7 to R278, line 7);
and despite his assertion, four years after the fact that he was somehow a partner in
the purchase, was excluded from the original title (R386) and only added as an
afterthought after William Pringle "let the family know" about the property
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(Appellee's Brief, p. 24). In any event, Bryan Pringle's evidence could only be
considered cumulative evidence, not determinative, such that if the evidence
produced by the Appellants is sufficient to raise a material issue of fact, Bryan
Pringle's testimony could not be dispositive. Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding,
909 P.2d 1283, 1292 (Utah App.,1996); Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193
(Utah, 1975)[a single affidavit is sufficient to raise an issue of material fact].
Finally, with regard to the final issue raised by the Appellees, that
Appellants have lost the right to appeal from a summary adjudication of a District
Court, because they failed to object to it's entry, Appellants can only admire the
ability of Appellee to analogize the present case, in which the lower court
summarily dismissed the matter to a case in which judgment was granted after a
trial on the merits. Appellants are unaware of any other Appellants who on appeal
of a summary disposition have been barred from appeal as Appellee seeks to have
this court bar the Appellants here.
For the foregoing reasons, the Appellants respectfully request this Honorable
Court reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand the matter for a trial
on the merits.
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